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Bradley Efron
Abstract. Familiar statistical tests and estimates are obtained by the
direct observation of cases of interest: a clinical trial of a new drug, for
instance, will compare the drug’s effects on a relevant set of patients
and controls. Sometimes, though, indirect evidence may be temptingly
available, perhaps the results of previous trials on closely related drugs.
Very roughly speaking, the difference between direct and indirect sta-
tistical evidence marks the boundary between frequentist and Bayesian
thinking. Twentieth-century statistical practice focused heavily on di-
rect evidence, on the grounds of superior objectivity. Now, however,
new scientific devices such as microarrays routinely produce enormous
data sets involving thousands of related situations, where indirect ev-
idence seems too important to ignore. Empirical Bayes methodology
offers an attractive direct/indirect compromise. There is already some
evidence of a shift toward a less rigid standard of statistical objectivity
that allows better use of indirect evidence. This article is basically the
text of a recent talk featuring some examples from current practice,
with a little bit of futuristic speculation.
Key words and phrases: Statistical learning, experience of others,
Bayesian and frequentist, James–Stein, Benjamini–Hochberg,
False Discovery Rates, effect size.
1. INTRODUCTION
This article is the text of a talk I gave twice in
2009, at the Objective Bayes Conference at Whar-
ton, and at the Joint Statistical Meetings in Wash-
ington, DC. Well, not quite the text. The printed
page gives me a chance to repair a couple of the more
gaping omissions in the verbal presentation, without
violating its rule of avoiding almost all mathemati-
cal technicalities.
Bradley Efron is Professor, Department of Statistics,
Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305, USA.
1Discussed in 10.1214/10-STS308A, 10.1214/10-STS308B
and 10.1214/10-STS308C; rejoinder at
10.1214/10-STS308REJ.
This is an electronic reprint of the original article
published by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics in
Statistical Science, 2010, Vol. 25, No. 2, 145–157. This
reprint differs from the original in pagination and
typographic detail.
Basically, however, I’ll stick to the text, which was
a broad-brush view of some recent trends in statis-
tical applications—their rapidly increasing size and
complexity—that are impinging on statistical the-
ory, both frequentist and Bayesian. An OpEd piece
on “practical philosophy” might be a good descrip-
tion of what I was aiming for. Most of the talk (as
I’ll refer to this from now on) uses simple exam-
ples, including some of my old favorites, to get at
the main ideas. There is no attempt at careful refer-
encing, just a short list of directly relevant sources
mentioned at the end.
I should warn you that the talk is organized more
historically than logically. It starts with a few exam-
ples of frequentist, Bayesian and empirical Bayesian
analysis, all bearing on “indirect evidence,” my catch-
all term for useful information that isn’t of obvious
direct application to a question of interest. This is
by way of a long build-up to my main point con-
cerning the torrent of indirect evidence uncorked by
modern scientific technologies such as the microar-
ray. It is fair to say that we are living in a new era of
1
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Fig. 1. Roberto Clemente’s batting averages over the 1970 baseball season (partially simulated). After 45 tries he had 18
hits for a batting average of 18/45 = 0.400; his average in the remainder of the season was 127/367 = 0.346.
statistical applications, one that is putting pressure
on traditional Bayesian and frequentist methodolo-
gies. Toward the end of the talk I’ll try to demon-
strate some of the pitfalls and opportunities of the
new era, finishing, as the title promises, with a few
words about the future.
2. DIRECT STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
A statistical argument, at least in popular par-
lance, is one in which many small pieces of evidence,
often contradictory, are amassed to produce an over-
all conclusion. A familiar and important example is
the clinical trial of a promising new drug. We don’t
expect the drug to work on every patient, or for ev-
ery placebo-receiving patient to fail, but perhaps,
overall, the new drug will perform “significantly”
better.
The clinical trial is collecting direct statistical ev-
idence, where each bit of data, a patient’s success
or failure, directly bears on the question of interest.
Direct evidence, interpreted by frequentist methods,
has been the prevalent mode of statistical appli-
cation during the past century. It is strongly con-
nected with the idea of scientific objectivity, which
accounts, I believe, for the dominance of frequentism
in scientific reporting.
Figure 1 concerns an example of direct statisti-
cal evidence, taken from the sports pages of 1970.
We are following the star baseball player Roberto
Clemente through his 1970 season. His batting av-
erage, number of successes (“hits”) over number of
tries (“at bats”) fluctuates wildly at first but set-
tles down as the season progresses. After 45 tries he
has 18 hits, for a batting average of 18/45 = 0.400
or “four hundred” in baseball terminology. The re-
mainder of the season is slightly less successful, with
127 hits out of 367 at bats for a batting average of
0.346 = 127/367, giving Clemente a full season aver-
age of 0.352.1 This is a classic frequentist estimate:
direct statistical evidence for Clemente’s 1970 bat-
ting ability.
In contentious areas such as drug efficacy, the de-
sire for direct evidence can be overpowering. A clin-
ical trial often has three arms: placebo, single dose
of new drug, and double dose. Even if the double
dose/placebo comparison yields strongly significant
results in favor of the new drug, a not-quite signifi-
cant result for the single dose/placebo comparison,
say p-value 0.07, will not be enough to earn FDA
approval. The single dose by itself must prove its
worth.
1These numbers are accurate, but I have to admit to sim-
ulating the rest of the figure by randomly dispersing his 18
hits over the first 45 tries, and similarly for the last 127 hits.
THE FUTURE OF INDIRECT EVIDENCE 3
My own feeling at this point would be that the
single dose is very likely to be vindicated in any
subsequent testing. The strong result for the dou-
ble dose adds indirect evidence to the direct, nearly
significant, single dose outcome. As the talk’s title
suggests, indirect statistical evidence is the focus of
interest here. My main point, which will take a while
to unfold, is that current scientific trends are pro-
ducing larger and more complex data sets in which
indirect evidence has to be accounted for: and these
trends will force some re-thinking of both frequentist
and Bayesian practices.
3. BAYESIAN INFERENCE
I was having coffee with a physicist friend and
her husband who, thanks to the miracle of sono-
grams, knew they were due to have twin boys. With-
out warning, the mother-to-be asked me what was
the probability her twins would be identical rather
than fraternal. Stalling for time, I asked if the doc-
tor had given her any further information. “Yes, he
said the proportion of identical twins is one-third.”
(I checked later with an epidemiology colleague who
confirmed this estimate.)
Thomas Bayes, 18th-century non-conformist En-
glish minister, would have died in vain if I didn’t
use his rule to answer the physicist mom. In this
case the prior odds
Pr{Identical}
Pr{Fraternal}
=
1/3
2/3
=
1
2
favor fraternal. However the likelihood ratio, the
current evidence from the sonogram, favors identi-
cal,
Pr{Twin boys|Identical}
Pr{Twin boys|Fraternal}
= 2,
since identical twins are always the same sex while
fraternal twins are of differing sexes half the time.
Bayes rule, published posthumously in 1763, is a
rule for combining evidence from different sources.
In this case it says that the posterior odds of identi-
cal to fraternal is obtained by simple multiplication.
Posterior odds = (Prior odds) · (Likelihood ratio)
= 12 · 2 = 1.
So my answer to the physicists was “50/50,” equal
chances of identical or fraternal. (This sounded like
pure guessing to them; I would have gotten a lot
more respect with “60/40.”)
Bayes rule is a landmark achievement. It was the
first breakthrough in scientific logic since the Greeks
and the beginning of statistical inference as a seri-
ous mathematical subject. From the point of view
of this talk, it also marked the formal introduction
of indirect evidence into statistical learning.
Both Clemente and the physicists are learning from
experience. Clemente is learning directly from his
own experience, in a strict frequentist manner. The
physicists are learning from their own experience
(the sonogram), but also indirectly from the experi-
ence of others: that one-third/two-thirds prior odds
is based on perhaps millions of previous twin births,
mostly not of the physicists’ “twin boys” situation.
Another way to state Bayes rule is as a device for
filtering out and using the relevant portions of past
experiences.
All statisticians, or almost all of them, enjoy Bayes
rule, but only a minority make much use of it. Learn-
ing only from direct experience is a dominant feature
of contemporary applied statistics, connected, as I
said, with notions of scientific objectivity. A funda-
mental Bayesian difficulty is that well-founded prior
distributions, like the twins one-thirds/two-thirds,
are rare in scientific practice. Much of 20th-century
Bayesian theory concerned subjective prior distribu-
tions, which are not very convincing in contentious
areas such as drug trials.
The holy grail of statistical theory is to use the
experience of others without the need for subjec-
tive prior distributions: in L. J. Savage’s words, to
enjoy the Bayesian omelette without breaking the
Bayesian eggs. I am going to argue that this grail
has grown holier, and more pressing, in the 21st cen-
tury. First though I wanted to say something about
frequentist use of indirect information.
4. REGRESSION MODELS
Bayesians have an advantage but not a monopoly
on the use of indirect evidence. Regression models
provide an officially sanctioned2 frequentist mecha-
nism for incorporating the experience of others.
Figure 2 concerns an example from Dr. Brian My-
ers’ Stanford nephrology laboratory: 157 healthy vol-
unteers have had their kidney function evaluated by
a somewhat arduous series of tests. An overall kid-
ney score, higher numbers better, is plotted versus
2Sanctioned, though not universally accepted as fully rele-
vant, as the three-arm drug example showed.
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Fig. 2. Kidney function plotted versus age for 157 healthy volunteers from the nephrology laboratory of Dr. Brian Myers.
The least squares regression line has a strong downward slope. A new donor age 55 has appeared, and we need to predict his
kidney score.
the volunteer’s age, illustrating a decline in func-
tion among the older subjects. (Kidney donation
was once limited to volunteers less than 60 years
old.) The decline is emphasized by the downward
slope of the least squares regression line.
A potential new donor, age 55, has appeared but
it is not practical to evaluate his kidney function
by the arduous testing procedure. How good are his
kidneys? As far as direct evidence is concerned, only
one of the 157 volunteers was 55, and he had score
−0.01. Most statisticians would prefer the estimate
obtained from the height at age 55 of the least square
line, −1.46. In Tukey’s evocative language, we are
“borrowing strength” from the 156 volunteers who
are not age 55.
Borrowing strength is a clear use of indirect ev-
idence, but invoked differently than through Bayes
theorem. Now every individual is adjusted to fit the
case of interest; in effect the regression model al-
lows us to adjust each volunteer to age 55. Linear
model theory permits a direct frequentist analysis
of the entire least squares fitting process, but that
shouldn’t conceal the indirect nature of its applica-
tion to individual cases.
One response of the statistical community to the
onslaught of increasingly large and complex data
sets has been to extend the reach of regression mod-
els: LARS, lasso, boosting, bagging, CART and pro-
jection pursuit being a few of the ambitious new
data-mining algorithms. Every self-respecting sports
program now has its own simplified data-mining pro-
gram, producing statements like “Jones has only 3
hits in 16 tries versus Pettitte.” This is direct evi-
dence run amok. Regression models seem to be con-
sidered beyond the sporting public’s sophistication,
but indirect evidence is everywhere in the sports
world, as I want to discuss next.
5. JAMES–STEIN ESTIMATION
Early in the 1970 baseball season, Carl Morris col-
lected the batting average data shown in the second
column of Table 1. Each of the 18 players had bat-
ted 45 times (they were all of those who had done
so) with varying degrees of success. Clemente, as
shown in Figure 1, had hit successfully 18 of the
45 times, for an observed average of 0.400 = 18/45.
Near the bottom of the table, Thurman Munson, an-
other star player, had only 8 hits; observed average
8/45 = 0.178. The grand average of the 18 players
at that point was 0.265.
Only about one-tenth of the season had elapsed,
and Morris considered predicting each player’s sub-
sequent batting average during the remainder of 1970.
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Since the players bat independently of each other—
Clemente’s successes don’t help Munson, nor vice
versa—it seems there is no alternative to using the
observed averages, at least not without employing
more baseball background knowledge.
However, that is not true. The James–Stein esti-
mates in the last column of the table are functions of
the observed averages, obtained by shrinking them
a certain amount of the way toward the grand aver-
age 0.265, as described next. By the end of the 1970
season, Morris could see the “truth,” the players’
averages over the remainder of the season. If predic-
tion error is measured by total squared discrepancy
from the truth, then James–Stein wins handsomely:
its total squared prediction error was less than one-
third of that for the observed averages. This wasn’t
a matter of luck, as we will see.
Suppose each player has a true expectation µi and
an observed average xi, following the model
µi ∼N (M,A) and xi|µi ∼N (µi, σ
2
0)(1)
for i = 1,2, . . . ,N = 18. Here M and A are mean
and variance hyper-parameters that determine the
Bayesian prior distribution; µi can be thought of as
the “truth” in Table 1, xi as the observed average,
and σ20 as its approximate binomial variance 0.265 ·
(1 − 0.265)/45. (I won’t worry about the fact that
xi is binomial rather than perfectly normal.)
The posterior expectation of µi given xi, which is
the Bayes estimator under squared error loss, is
µˆ
(Bayes)
i =M +B(xi −M)
Table 1
Batting averages for 18 major league players early in the
1970 season (“Observed”) and their averages for the
remainder of the season (“Truth”). Also the James–Stein
predictions
Name Hits/AB Observed “Truth” James–Stein
1. Clemente 18/45 0.400 0.346 0.294
2. F. Robinson 17/45 0.378 0.298 0.289
3. F. Howard 16/45 0.356 0.276 0.285
4. Johnstone 15/45 0.333 0.222 0.280
...
...
...
...
...
14. Petrocelli 10/45 0.222 0.264 0.256
15. E. Rodriguez 10/45 0.222 0.226 0.256
16. Campaneris 9/45 0.200 0.286 0.252
17. Munson 8/45 0.178 0.316 0.247
18. Alvis 7/45 0.156 0.200 0.242
Grand average 0.265 0.265 0.265
(2)
where B =
A
A+ σ20
.
If A= σ20 , for example, Bayes rule shrinks each ob-
served average xi half way toward the prior mean
M . Using Bayes rule reduces the total squared error
of prediction, compared to using the obvious esti-
mates xi, by a factor of 1−B. This is a 50% savings
if A = σ20 , and more if the prior variance A is less
than σ20 .
Baseball experts might know accurate values for
M and A, or M and B, but we are not assuming
expert prior knowledge here. The James–Stein esti-
mator can be motivated quite simply: unbiased es-
timates Mˆ and Bˆ are obtained from the vector of
observations x = (x1, x2, . . . , xN ) (e.g., Mˆ = x¯ the
grand average) and substituted into formula (2). In
Herbert Robbins’ apt terminology, James–Stein is
an empirical Bayes estimator. It doesn’t perform
as well as the actual Bayes estimate (2), but under
model (1) the penalty is surprisingly small.
All of this seems interesting enough, but a skeptic
might ask where the normal prior distributions µi
ind
∼
N (M,A) in (1) are coming from. In fact, James and
Stein didn’t use normal priors, or any priors at all, in
their derivation. Instead they proved the following
frequentist theorem.
Theorem 1 (1956). If xi ∼ N (µi, σ
2
0) indepen-
dently for i = 1,2, . . . ,N, N ≥ 4, then the James–
Stein estimator always beats the obvious estimator
xi in terms of expected total squared estimation er-
ror.
This is the single most striking result of post-
World War II statistical theory. It is sometimes called3
Stein’s paradox for it says that Clemente’s good per-
formance does increase our estimate for Munson (e.g.,
by increasing Mˆ = x¯) and vice versa, even though
they succeed or fail independently. In addition to
the direct evidence of each player’s batting average,
we gain indirect evidence from the other 17 averages.
James–Stein estimation is not an unmitigated bless-
ing. Low total squared error can conceal poor per-
formance on genuinely unusual cases. Baseball fans
know from past experience that Clemente was an
unusually good hitter, who is learning too much
3Willard James was Charles Stein’s graduate student. Stein
had shown earlier that another, less well-motivated, estimator
dominated the obvious rule.
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from the experience of others by being included in
a cohort of less-talented players. I’ll call this the
Clemente problem in what follows.
6. LARGE-SCALE MULTIPLE INFERENCE
All of this is a preface, and one that could have
been written 50 years ago, to what I am really in-
terested in talking about here. Large-scale multiple
inference, in which thousands of statistical problems
are considered at once, has become a fact of life for
21st-century statisticians. There is just too much in-
direct evidence to ignore in such situations. Coming
to grips with our new, more intense, scientific en-
vironment is a major enterprise for the statistical
community, and one that is already affecting both
theory and practice.
Rupert Miller’s book Simultaneous Statistical In-
ference appeared in 1966, lucidly summarizing the
post-war boom in multiple-testing theory. The book
is overwhelmingly frequentist, aimed mainly at the
control of type I error, and concerned with the simul-
taneous analysis of between 2 and perhaps 10 testing
problems. Microarray technology introduced in the
1990s dramatically raised the ante: number of prob-
lems N now easily exceeds 10,000; “SNP chips” have
N = 500,000+, and imaging devices reach higher
still.
Figure 3 concerns a microarray study in which the
researchers were on a fishing expedition to find genes
involved in the development of prostate cancer: 102
men, 50 healthy controls and 52 prostate cancer pa-
tients, each had expression levels for N = 6033 genes
measured on microarrays. The resulting data ma-
trix had N = 6033 rows, one for each gene, and 102
columns, one for each man.
As a first step in looking for “interesting” genes, a
two-sample t-statistic ti comparing cancer patients
with controls was computed for each gene i, i =
1,2, . . . ,N , and then converted to a z-value
zi =Φ
−1(F100(ti))(3)
with Φ and F100 the c.d.f.’s of a standard normal
and t100 variate. Under the usual textbook condi-
tions, zi will have a standard normal distribution in
the null (uninteresting) situation where genetic ex-
pression levels are identically distributed for controls
and patients,
H0 : zi ∼N (0,1).(4)
A histogram of the N = 6033 z-values appears in
Figure 3. It is fit reasonably well by the “theoret-
ical null” curve that would apply if all the genes
followed (4), except that there is an excess of tail
values, which might indicate some interesting “non-
null” genes responding differently in cancer and con-
trol subjects.
Here I will concentrate on the 49 genes having
zi exceeding 3.0, as indicated by the hash marks.
Figure 4 shows a close-up of the right tail, where
we notice that 49 is much greater than 8.14, the
expected number of zi’s exceeding 3.0 under full null
conditions. The ratio is
F̂dr(3.0) = 8.1449 =
1
6 .(5)
where Fdr stands for false discovery rate, in Ben-
jamini and Hochberg’s evocative terminology. Re-
porting the list of 49 back to the investigators seems
like a good bet if it only contains 1/6 duds, but can
we believe that value?
Benjamini and Hochberg’s (1995) paper answered
the question with what I consider the second most
striking theorem of post-war statistics. For any given
cutoff point c let N(c) be the number of zi’s observed
to exceed c, E0(c) the expected number exceeding c
if all genes are null (4), and
F̂dr(c) =E0(c)/N(c).(6)
[In (5), c= 3.0,N(c) = 49, and E0(c) = 8.14.] Choose
an Fdr control value q between 0 and 1 and let cq
be the smallest value of c such that F̂dr(c)≤ q.
Theorem 2. If the N z-values are independent
of each other, then the rule that rejects the null hy-
pothesis (4) for all cases having zi ≥ cq will make the
expected proportion of false discoveries no greater
than q.
In the prostate data example, choosing q = 1/6
gives cq = 3.0 and yields a list of 49 presumably in-
teresting genes. Assuming independence4, the the-
orem says that the expected proportion of actual
null cases on the list is no greater than 1/6. That is
a frequentist expectation, Benjamini and Hochberg
like James and Stein having worked frequentisti-
cally, but once again there is an instructive Bayesian
interpretation.
A very simple Bayes model for simultaneous hy-
pothesis testing, the two-groups model, assumes that
each gene has prior probability p0 or p1 = 1− p0 of
4This isn’t a bad assumption for the prostate data, but a
dangerous one in general for microarray experiments. How-
ever, dependence usually has little effect on the theorem’s
conclusion. A more common choice of q is 0.10.
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Fig. 3. Histogram of N = 6033z-values from the prostate cancer study compared with the theoretical null density that would
apply if all the genes were uninteresting. Hash marks indicate the 49 z-values exceeding 3.0.
Fig. 4. Close-up of right tail of the prostate data z-value histogram; 49 zi’s exceed 3.0, compared to an expected number 8.14
if all genes were null (4).
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being null or non-null, with corresponding z-value
density f0(z) or f1(z):
Prior probability
{p0,
p1,
zi ∼
{
f0(z),
f1(z).
(7)
Let F0(z) and F1(z) be the right-sided c.d.f.’s (sur-
vival functions) corresponding to f0 and f1, and
F (z) their mixture,
F (z) = p0F0(z) + p1F1(z).(8)
Applying Bayes theorem shows that the true false
discovery rate is
Fdr(c)≡ Pr{gene i null|zi ≥ c}
(9)
= p0F0(c)/F (c).
(Left-sided c.d.f.’s perform just as well, but it is con-
venient to work on the right here.)
Of course we can’t apply the Bayesian result (9)
unless we know p0, f0, and f1 in (7). Once again
though, a simple empirical Bayes estimate is avail-
able. Under the theoretical null (4), F0(z) = 1 −
Φ(z), the standard normal right-sided c.d.f.; p0 will
usually be close to 1 in fishing expedition situa-
tions and has little effect on Fdr(c). (Benjamini and
Hochberg set p0 = 1. It can be estimated from the
data, and I will take it as known here.) That leaves
the mixture c.d.f. F (z) as the only unknown. But by
definition, all N zi values follow F (z), so we can esti-
mate it by the empirical c.d.f. Fˆ (z) = #{zi ≥ z}/N ,
leading to the empirical Bayes estimate of (9),
F̂dr(c) = p0F0(c)/Fˆ (c).(10)
The two definitions of F̂dr(c), (6) and (10), are the
same since E0(c) = Np0F0(c) and Fˆ (c) = N(c)/N .
This means we can restate Benjamini and Hochberg’s
theorem in empirical Bayes terms: the list of cases
reported by BH(q), the Benjamini–Hochberg-level q
rule, is essentially those cases having estimated pos-
terior probability of being null no greater than q.
The Benjamini–Hochberg algorithm clearly
involves indirect evidence. In this case, each z-value
is learning from the other N − 1 values: if, say, only
10 instead of 49 z-values had exceeded 3.0, then
F̂dr(c) would equal 0.81 (i.e., “very likely null”) so
a gene with zi ≥ 3.0 would now not be reported as
non-null.
I have been pleasantly surprised at how quickly
false discovery rate control was accepted by statis-
ticians and our clients. It is fundamentally different
from type I error control, the standard for nearly
a century, in its Bayesian aspect, its use of indirect
evidence, and in the fact that it provides an explicit
estimate of nullness F̂dr(z) rather than just a yes/no
decision.5
7. THE PROPER USE OF INDIRECT
EVIDENCE
The false discovery rate story is a promising sign
of our profession’s ability to embrace new methods
for new problems. However, in moving beyond the
confines of classical statistics we are also moving
outside the wall of protection that a century of the-
ory and experience has erected against inferential
error.
Within its proper venue, it is hard to go very
wrong with a frequentist analysis of direct evidence.
I find it quite easy to go wrong in large-scale data
analyses. This section and the next offer a couple of
examples of the pitfalls yawning in the use of indi-
rect evidence. None of this is meant to be discourag-
ing: difficulties are what researchers thrive on, and
I fully expect statisticians to successfully navigate
these new waters.
The results of another microarry experiment, this
time concerning leukemia, are summarized in Fig-
ure 5. High-density oligonucleotide microarrays pro-
vided expression levels on N = 7128 genes for 72 pa-
tients, 45 with ALL (acute lymphoblastic leukemia)
and 27 with AML (acute myeloid leukemia), the lat-
ter having worse prognosis. Two-sample t-statistics
provided z-values zi for each gene, as with the prostate
study.
Figure 5 shows that this time the center of the
z-value histogram does not approximate a N (0,1)
density. Instead, it is much too wide: a maximum
likelihood fit to central histogram heights gave es-
timated proportion p0 = 0.93 of null genes in the
two-groups model (7), and an empirical null density
estimate
f0(z)∼N (0.09,1.68
2),(11)
more than half again as wide as the N (0,1) theo-
retical null (4). The dashed curve shows (11) nicely
following the histogram height near the center while
the estimated proportion of non-null genes p1 = 1−
p0 = 0.07 appear as heavy tails, noticeably on the
left.
5Although one might consider p-values to provide such es-
timates in classical testing.
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Fig. 5. Histogram of z-values for N = 7128 genes in a microarray study comparing two types of leukemia. The N (0,1)
theoretical null is much narrower than the histogram center; a normal fit to the central histogram height gives empirical null
N (0.09,1.682). Both curves have been scaled by their respective estimates of p0 in (7).
Fig. 6. DTI study z-values comparing 6 dyslexic children with 6 normal controls, at N = 15,443 voxels; shown is horizontal
section of 848 voxels; x indicates distance from back of brain (left) to front (right). The vertical line at x = 50 divides the
brain into back and front halves.
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At this point one could maintain faith in the the-
oretical null but at the expense of concluding that
about 2500 (35%) of the genes are involved in
AML/ALL differences. On the other hand, there
are plenty of reasons to doubt the theoretical null.
In particular, the leukemia data comes from an ob-
servational study, not a randomized experiment, so
that unobserved covariates (age, sex, health status,
race, etc.) could easily add a component of variance
to both the null and non-null z-values.
The crucial question here has to do with the nu-
merator E0(c) in F̂dr(c) =E0(c)/N(c), the expected
number of null cases exceeding c. The theoretical
N (0,1) null predicts many fewer of these than does
the empirical null (11). The fact that we might esti-
mate the appropriate null distribution from evidence
at hand—bordering on heresy from the point of view
of classical testing theory—shows the opportunities
inherent in large-scale studies, as well as the novel
inferential questions surrounding the use of indirect
evidence.
8. RELEVANCE
Large-scale testing algorithms are usually carried
out under the tacit assumption that all available
cases should be analyzed together: for instance, em-
ploying a single false discovery analysis for all the
genes in a given microarray experiment. This can be
a dangerous assumption, as the example illustrated
in Figure 6 will show.
Twelve children, six dyslexics and six normal con-
trols, received DTI (diffusion tensor imaging) scans,
measuring fluid diffusion at N = 15,443 locations
(voxels) in the brain. A z-value zi was computed at
each voxel such that the theoretical null hypothesis
zi ∼ N (0,1) should apply to locations where there
is no dyslexic/normal distributional difference. The
goal of course was to pinpoint areas of genuine dif-
ference.
Figure 6 indicates the z-values in a horizontal slice
of the brain about half-way from bottom to top.
Open circles, colored red, indicate zi ≥ 0, solid red
circles zi ≥ 2; green + symbols indicate zi < 0, with
green # for zi < −2. The x-axis measures distance
from the back of the brain to the front, left to right.
Spatial correlation among the zi’s is evident: red
circles are near red circles and green +’s near other
green +’s. The Benjamini–Hochberg Fdr control al-
gorithm tends to perform as claimed as an hypothesis-
testing device, even under substantial correlation.
However, there is an empirical Bayes price to pay:
correlation makes F̂dr(c) (10) less dependable as an
estimate of the true Bayes probability (9). Just how
much less is a matter of current study.
There is something else to worry about in Figure
6: the front half of the brain, x ≥ 50, seems to be
redder (i.e., with more positive z-values) than the
back half. This is confirmed by the superimposed
histograms for the two halves, about 7700 voxels
each, seen in Figure 7. Separate Fdr tests at control
level q = 0.10 yield 281 “significant” voxels for the
front-half data, all those with zi ≥ 2.69, and none
at all for the back half. But if we analyze all 15443
voxels at once, the Fdr test yields only 198 signifi-
cant voxels, those having zi ≥ 3.02. Which analysis
is correct?
This is the kind of question my warning about
difficult new inference problems was aimed at. No-
tice that the two histograms differ near their centers
as well as in the tails. The Fdr analyses employed
thoretical N (0,1) null distributions. Using empirical
nulls as with the leukemia data gives quite different
null distributions, raising further questions about
proper comparisons.
The front/back division of the brain was arbitrary
and not founded on any scientific criteria. Figure 8
shows all 15,443 zi’s plotted against xi, the voxel’s
distance from the back. We see waves in the z-values,
at the lower percentiles as well as at the top, crest-
ing near x = 64. Disturbingly, most of the 281 sig-
nificant voxels for the front-half analysis came from
this crest.
Maybe I should be doing local Fdr tests of some
sort, or perhaps making regression adjustments (e.g.,
subtracting off the running median) before applying
an Fdr procedure. We have returned to a version of
the Clemente problem: which are the relevant vox-
els for deciding whether or not any given voxel is
responding differently in dyslexics and controls? In
other words, where is the relevant indirect informa-
tion?
9. THE NORMAL HIERARCHICAL MODEL
My final example of indirect evidence and empir-
ical Bayes inference concerns the normal hierarchi-
cal model. This is a simple but important Bayesian
model where µ, a parameter of interest, comes from
some prior density g(·) and we get to observe a nor-
mal variate z centered at µ,
µ∼ g(·) and z|µ∼N (µ,1).(12)
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Fig. 7. Separate histograms for zi’s from the front and back halves of the brain, DTI study. The heavy right tail of the
front-half data yields 281 significant voxels in an Fdr test, control level q = 0.10.
Fig. 8. z-values for the 15,443 voxels plotted versus their distance from the back of the brain. A disturbing wave pattern is
evident, cresting near x= 64. Most of the 281 significant voxels in Figure 7 come from this crest.
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Both the James–Stein and Benjamini–Hochberg es-
timators can be motivated from (12),
JS :g =N (M,A) and
(13)
BH :g = p0δ0 + p1g1.
In the latter, δ0 is a delta function at 0 while g1 is
an arbitrary density giving f1 in (7) by convolution,
f1 = g1 ∗ϕ where ϕ is the standard normal density.
In the BH setting, we might call µi (the value of µ
for the ith case) the effect size. For prediction pur-
poses, we want to identify cases not only with µi 6= 0
but with large effect size. A very useful property of
the normal hierarchical model (12) allows us to cal-
culate the Bayes estimate of effect size directly from
the convolution density f = g ∗ϕ without having to
calculate g,
f(z) =
∫
∞
−∞
ϕ(z − µ)g(µ)dµ.(14)
Lemma 1. Under the normal hierarchical model
(12),
E{µ|z}= z + f ′(z)/f(z),(15)
where f ′(z) = df(z)/dz.
The marginal density of z in model (12) is f(z).
So if we observe z = (z1, z2, . . . , zN ) from repeated
realizations of (µi, zi), we can fit a smooth density
estimate fˆ(z) to the zi’s and use the lemma to ap-
proximate E{µi|zi},
z−→ fˆ(z)−→ Eˆ{µi|zi}= zi + fˆ
′(zi)/f(zi).(16)
This has been done in Figure 9 for the prostate data
of Figure 3, with fˆ(z) a natural spline, fit with 7
degrees of freedom to the heights of Figure 3’s his-
togram bars (all of them, not just the central ones
we used to estimate empirical nulls).
The effect size estimates µˆi = Eˆ{µi|zi} are nearly
zero for |zi| less than 2 but increase linearly outside
of this interval. Gene 610 has the largest z-value,
z610 = 5.29, with estimated effect size µˆ610 = 4.11.
Table 2 shows the top 10 genes in order of |zi|, and
their corresponding effect sizes µˆi. The µˆi values are
shrunk toward the origin, but in a manner appropri-
ate to the BH prior in (13), not JS.
The necessity for shrinkage reflects selection bias:
the top 10 genes were winners in a competition with
6023 others; in addition to being “good” in the sense
of having genuinely large effect sizes, they’ve proba-
bly been “lucky” in that their random measurement
errors were directed away from zero. Regression to
the mean is another name for the shrinkage effect.
A wonderful fact is that Bayes estimates are im-
mune to selection bias! If µˆ610 = 4.11 was the actual
Bayes estimate E{µ610|z} then it would not matter
that we became interested in Gene 610 only after
examining all 6033 z-values: 4.11 would still be our
estimate. This may seem surprising, but it follows
immediately from Bayes theorem, a close cousin to
results such as “Bayes inference in a clinical trial is
not affected by intermediate looks at the data.”
Any assumption of a Bayes prior is a powerful
statement of indirect evidence. In our example it
amounts to saying, “We have an infinite number N
of relevant prior observations (µ, z) with z = 5.29,
and for those the average value of µ is 4.11.” The
N = ∞ prior observations outweigh any selection
effects in the comparatively puny current sample,
which is another way of stating the wonderful fact.
Of course, we usually don’t have an infinite amount
of relevant past experience. Our empirical Bayes es-
timate µˆ610 = 4.11 is based on just the N = 6033
observed zi values. One might ask how immune are
empirical Bayes estimates to selection bias? This
is the kind of important indirect-evidence question
that I’m hoping statisticians will soon be able to
answer.
10. LEARNING FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF
OTHERS
As I said earlier, current statistical practice is dom-
inated by frequentist methodology based on direct
evidence. I don’t believe this kind of single-problem
N = 1 thinking, even supplemented by aggressive re-
gression technology, will carry the day in an era of
Table 2
Top 10 genes, those with largest values of |zi|, in the prostate
study and their corresponding effect size estimates µˆi
Gene z-value µˆi = Eˆ{µi|zi}
1 610 5.29 4.11
2 1720 4.83 3.65
3 332 4.47 3.24
4 364 −4.42 −3.57
5 914 4.40 3.16
6 3940 −4.33 −3.52
7 4546 −4.29 −3.47
8 1068 4.25 2.99
9 579 4.19 2.92
10 4331 −4.14 −3.30
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Fig. 9. Empirical Bayes effect size estimate Eˆ{µ|z} (16), prostate data of Figure 3. Dots indicate the top 10 genes, those
with the greatest values of |zi|. The top gene, i= 610, has zi = 5.29 and estimated effect size 4.11.
enormous data sets and large-scale inferences. The
proper use of indirect evidence—learning from the
experience of others—is a pressing challenge for both
theoretical and applied statisticians. Perhaps I should
just say that frequentists need to become better
Bayesians.
This doesn’t let Bayesians off the hook. A “the-
ory of everything” can be a dangerous weapon in the
messy world of statistical applications. The tacit as-
sumption of having N =∞ relevant past cases avail-
able for any observed value of the data can lead
to a certain reckless optimism in one’s conclusions.
Frequentism is a leaky philosophy but a good set
of work rules. Its fundamentally conservative atti-
tude encourages a careful examination of what can
go wrong as well as right with statistical procedures
and, as I’ve tried to say, there’s no shortage of wrong
steps possible in our new massive-data environment.
Fisherian procedures, which I haven’t talked about
here, often provide a pleasant compromise between
Bayesian and frequentist methodology. Maximum
likelihood estimation in particular can be interpreted
from both viewpoints, as a preferred way of com-
bining evidence from different sources. Fisher’s the-
ory was developed in a small-sample direct-evidence
framework, however, and doesn’t answer the ques-
tions raised here. Mainly it makes me hope for a new
generation of Fishers, Neymans, Hotellings, etc., to
deal with 21st-century problems.
Empirical Bayes methods seem to me to be the
most promising candidates for a combined
Bayesian/frequentist attack on large-scale data anal-
ysis problems, but they have been “promising” for
50-plus years now, and have yet to form into a coher-
ent theory. Most pressingly, both frequentists and
Bayesians enjoy convincing information theories say-
ing how well one can do in any given situation, while
empirical Bayesians still operate on an ad hoc basis.
This is an exciting time to be a statistician: we
have a new class of difficult but not impossible prob-
lems to wrestle with, which is the most any intellec-
tual discipline can hope for. The wrestling process is
already well underway, as witnessed in our journals
and conferences. Like most talks that have “future”
in the title, this one will probably seem quaint and
limited not very long from now, but perhaps the
discussants will have more to say about that.
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